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Equitable Healthcare for 
Divisive Times 
 
May 27, 2018 Leslie Francis Beyond Disadvantage: Disability, Law and 
Bioethics, Disability, Health Law Policy, Leslie Francis 
 
By Leslie Francis 
 
Another anniversary of President Bush’s signing of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) is coming up in late July, yet the nation 
remains far from offering even a semblance of equitable societal 
opportunity to most individuals with disabilities. 
 
For them, full social participation is dismissed as merely an idealistic 
dream. With its focus on restoration of full functioning for patients, the 
health care delivery system might be supposed an exception, but a 
closer look shows the opposite is true. 
 
Physicians’ offices, clinics, and hospitals too often have not been 
made accessible. Too frequently, these facilities have diagnostic or 
treatment equipment that some people, due to disability, cannot use. 
Health care provider staff are not trained to interact with or assess 
disabled individuals, and may be swayed by implicit biases that target 
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As for the courts, the Supreme Court’s decision over thirty years ago 
in Alexander v. Choate continues to reassure states in their efforts to 
curtail access to their Medicaid programs in ways that 
disproportionately affect people with disabilities. In fact, over the 
years since enactment of the ADA, the courts—and the US Supreme 
Court most notably—have been especially frustrating crafters of 
barriers to disability civil rights, so much so that the usually divided 
Congress came together across the aisles to pass the ADA 
Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008. 
 
In creating the ADAAA, the Congress responded most forcefully, and 
almost unanimously, to the Court’s determinations that people do not 
count as disabled unless they are virtually unable to do any of the 
ordinary activities of daily living—so direly impaired, that is, that even 
with accommodation to their disabilities or modifications to expunge 
physical, sensory, intellectual or emotional barriers, they cannot make 
use of societal opportunity or execute any socially useful role. 
 
The ADAAA addressed the problem of who is disabled, 
but not the more basic problem of what disability civil 
rights require. 
 
Since enactment of the ADAAA, people seeking to use that statute to 
enforce their civil rights have been far less likely to find their claims 
dismissed on the ground that they fall outside of the group of people 
the statute was designed to protect. But they now find their claims 
dismissed without trial on the grounds that they were not qualified or 
eligible for what they sought, or that their exclusion was not on the 
basis of their disability. The ADAAA addressed the problem of who is 
disabled, but not the more basic problem of what disability civil rights 
require. 
 
In our contribution to the upcoming Petrie-Flom Center symposium 
Beyond Disadvantage: Disability, Law, and Bioethics, Anita Silvers 
and I develop an account of disability civil rights in access to health 
care. Our account explicates the concept of “meaningful access” put 
forth in Alexander v. Choate but ever since applied in a way that has 
proved misleading. In that decision—upholding Tennessee’s cutback 
in hospital stays for Medicaid patients to fourteen days annually 
against a challenge that it disparately impacted the disabled—the 
Court said that the Rehabilitation Act required federally funded 
programs to give meaningful access to their benefits to the disabled 
and non-disabled alike. But the Court also said that because people 
with disabilities and people without disabilities each had access to the 
fourteen days, the standard of meaningful access was met, even if 
due to their disabilities some people could not access adequate 
treatment in that short time. 
 
That flawed reasoning resulted from the Court’s failure to take into 
account a critical difference between two ways of responding to 
difference: accommodation and modification. Here’s what the 
difference is, and why it matters: “Accommodations” make 
adjustments for individual differences, so that people with disabilities 
can perform jobs, participate in activities, or receive services. 
 
“Modifications” change practices or policies or reconstruct the built 
environment; their effects extend beyond particular individuals. 
Accommodations are justified by and require evidence of individual 
needs and abilities. Modifications are subject to different challenges: 
that they are inconvenient, expensive, inefficient, or distributively 
unjust. Modifications may also be inclusive in ways that extend 
beyond disabilities, as curb cuts famously do by facilitating pushing 
strollers and baby carriages in crossing streets. 
 
If a request for a modifying policy change is seen as an individual 
accommodation, or a request for an individual accommodation is 
confused with a demand for policy change, the results for disability 
civil rights can be dire—and that’s exactly what happened as the 
Court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act, and ultimately the ADA. 
 
The first major case interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, Southeastern 
Community College v. Davis created exactly this confusion. Here the 
Court failed to deal critically with the College’s shift in the terms of 
analysis from accommodation for a student nurse to modification of 
an entire nursing curriculum, and thus failed to address whether the 
College’s outright refusal to consider any accommodation or weigh 
Davis’s potential with accommodation for a useful nursing career, 
was unreasonable. 
 
The Court’s initial mistake in Davis was compounded in Alexander v. 
Choate. The disabled plaintiffs in Tennessee sought a modification of 
Tennessee’s length of stay policy for Medicaid recipients. Instead, 
they were perceived by the Court as seeking unreasonable 
accommodations for themselves. The Court construed them as 
asserting “affirmative action” in the form of maximally effective 
treatment, a demand that was easy to re-imagine in terms of unfair 
advantage. Instead, the Court should have examined whether 
Tennessee’s outright refusal to consider even the possibility of 
reasonable modification of the policy so that disabled people’s access 
to medical care might be meaningful discriminated against the 
disabled. 
 
In our contribution to the symposium, we explore how this distinction 
between accommodations and modifications can facilitate 
understanding meaningful access to health care. 
 
Sometimes, all that is required is accommodation to enable a person 
with a disability to receive a benefit that is equitable. But sometimes, 
policies, practices, and environments must be modified, in which case 
health care providers should consider offering access to care in ways 
that offer more inclusive and meaningful participation for all.	
